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ABSTR ACT: This study utilizes three approaches to investigate the extent to which firms with
an innovation focused strategy engage in earnings management through the use of income
smoothing, real activities, and the use of discretionary accruals. Several results are reported.
First, firms with an innovative strategy report a greater percentage of earnings in the fourth
quarter indicating greater earnings management. Second, innovative firms use real activities
to a greater extent than non-innovative firms to manage earnings when income approaches
certain earnings benchmarks. Lastly, innovative strategy firms engage in the use of discretionary accruals to a greater degree than other firms.
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INTRODUCTION

The literature shows there are two basic types of business strategies: cost leadership
and differentiation (Porter, 1985; Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 1997). Firms
adopting a cost leadership strategy focus on being the least expensive producer of a
product or the least expensive provider of a particular service. On the other hand, firms
pursuing a differentiation strategy attempt to offer a unique product or service. Often firms
with a differentiation strategy, a growth strategy or an innovation strategy are referred to
synonymously (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). In order to obtain their economic objectives, firms
with a either a cost leadership or a differentiation strategy engage in innovative activities
in several categories including extending their existing product range, increasing sales and
market share, or cutting costs (Guan et al., 2009).
Innovation is widely considered to be the lifeblood of corporate survival and growth
(Zahra & Covin, 1994). Ittner and Larcker (2001) define an innovative firm as one that
focuses on being first-to-market with a variety of original products or services.3 Most early
empirical studies examining innovation are derived from the classic discussion provided
1 Montana State University, Bozeman, MT, USA, e-mail: nathan.jeppson@montana.edu
2 University of Scranton, Kania School of Management, Scranton, PA, USA, e-mail: david.salerno@scranton.edu
3 Ittner and Larcker (2001) indicate that innovative firms may also be referred to as “prospector” or “build”
firms in the literature. Conversely, firms that follow a cost leadership strategy might also be termed “defender” or “harvest” firms.
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by Schumpeter (1942). Schumpeter outlines that new technology is successful innovation
through combined investment decisions. However firms that are regarded as innovative
might be innovative in several different areas. For example, extant literature often classifies
innovation into broad categories such as process innovation, product innovation, or
business model innovation (e.g. Nicholas, 2008). While innovation is a complex construct,
for purposes of this paper an innovative firm is one that pursues product innovations.
While it is clear that firms engage in earnings management, the motivation of this paper
is to investigate the additional extent to which firms with strategy focused on innovation
(IS firms) engage in earnings management. The existence of earnings management is well
documented in the literature (e.g., Hayn 1995; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge,
Patel & Zeckhauser, 1999; Das, Shroff & Zhang 2009; see also literature regarding research
and development intensive firms such as Cheng, 2004). Literature shows that earnings
can be manipulated using either accounting accruals or real activities (e.g., reduction
in research and development spending, see Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). Accrual-based
earnings management has no direct effect on cash flows, while real activity-based earnings
management will affect firm cash flows and could affect accruals as well.
Knowledge regarding the extent to which innovative firms participate in earnings
manipulation will be of special interest to investors and to other stakeholders because
an innovative strategy could provide several competitive advantages: developing new
products or new product lines that enthuse the customer, keeping ahead of competitors
in a given industry, and entering into new market segments or developing new businesses
(Bowonder et al., 2010).
Extant research provides several indications that IS firms may be more likely to manage
earnings than are non-IS firms. First, an IS firm’s investment in new products, processes
or business models is inherently risky and uncertain (Choi & Ahn, 2010), therefore,
management may have more pressure from the market to smooth earnings in order to
reduce these large aberrations in income. Second, IS firms may be in need of large pools
of capital to support new research projects (Choi & Ahn, 2010). The need for capital
may place pressure on management to inflate earnings in order to receive the desired
funding from investors. IS firms invest more capital in research and development (R&D)
than do non-IS firms and therefore face increased fundraising pressures. Third, recent
research indicates that innovative firms are underpriced (Ciftci, Lev & Radhakrishnan,
2011) and that the market undervalues R&D expenditures (Ali, Ciftci & Cready, 2012)
which could reasonably be expected to encourage firms to manage earnings. Finally,
prior literature has clearly demonstrated that R&D expenses provide an opportunity for
earnings management. R&D spending can easily be manipulated to influence earnings
overall (Bartov, 1993; Bens, Nagar & Franco-Wong, 2002; Bens et al., 2003; Cohen, Dey
& Lys, 2008). Also, seminal studies regarding earnings management by Hayn (1995) and
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show that firms are more likely to manipulate earnings
around zero values of net income. Since one method firms often use to manage earnings
is through a reduction in R&D expenses (Baber, Fairfield & Haggard, 1991; Bushee, 1998;
Cheng, 2004; Garcia & Young, 2009), IS firms might be more likely to manage earnings
because they often have high levels of R&D that could be temporarily curtailed as a means
of reducing expenses and thus managing earnings (Holthausen, Larcker & Sloan, 1995).
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Three tests are used to examine the relationship between IS firms and earnings
management. The first is a test of income smoothing following Murphy (2001). The firm’s
fourth quarter net income is regressed on a dummy variable representing high net income
through the first three quarters of the current year, a proxy for innovation strategy, and
an interaction term of those two variables. We find that IS firms derive a greater portion
of their income from the fourth quarter of the year than non-IS firms indicating that IS
firms are manipulating income to a greater extent. The second test investigates the use of
real activities such as the strategic use of R&D spending discussed earlier in this section
(Roychowdhury, 2006). We find that IS firms employ the use of real activities to meet
earnings benchmarks to a greater degree than do non-IS firms, thus indicating a greater
degree of earnings management. Finally, the third test examines earnings management
by use of discretionary accrual techniques following Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008). We
find evidence that IS firms also use discretionary accruals to manipulate income more
than non-IS firms. This study is distinct in that it examines the relationship between firm
innovation focused strategy and earnings management. The results of this paper will
contribute to the literature by revealing the impact that an overall innovative firm strategy
has on earnings management.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of the
literature regarding strategy, innovation, and earnings management. Section 3 provides
the hypotheses and research design. Results and discussion regarding the proposed tests
are included in section 4. Section 5 provides a conclusion and limitations

1 RELATED PRIOR RESEARCH
According to Chaney et al. (1991), innovation is the basis for all economic growth and
development. They outline three primary areas of innovation research: (1) the efficiency
of innovation investment; (2) the Schumpeterian hypothesis; and (3) the social benefits
of innovation.
First, the literature examines whether a competitive marketplace effectively and efficiently
invests in new process, product, and business model development. For example, Matolcsy
and Wyatt (2008) determine how technological innovations drive the market value of
the firm through earnings growth. This study uses three factors to determine the level of
innovation: the success of prior technology investments, the complexity of technology and
the development period of the technology. The results show that when the three factors
that facilitate innovation are present alongside earnings growth, the market value of equity
is greatly enhanced. At the firm level, Inderst and Klein (2007) show how managers have
a tendency to overinvest in their own projects during the corporate budgeting process due
to their own biases.
Second, prior studies examine the “Schumpeterian hypothesis” and whether a monopoly (or
near monopoly) is necessary to foster innovation (Boldrin & Levin, 2009). Smythe (2010)
characterizes the Schumpeterian hypothesis as the idea that highly concentrated industries
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are more conducive to rapid technological innovation than less concentrated industries. For
example, a study by Gayle (2003) conducts an empirical examination of the Schumpeterian
hypothesis by using citation-weighted patent count to measure innovative output.
Finally, other research explores the role government has in fostering innovation and
the social benefits of innovation. Social benefits of innovation are product inventions
or process and business model developments that have value to society. For instance,
innovations in the pharmaceutical industry have contributed to societal health while
innovations in the high-tech industry have increased society’s access to information. A
recent example of this type of research is Wagner (2010) where the author explores the link
between innovation with high social benefits and corporate social performance and the
role that family firms play in this link. Wagner (2010) finds that family firms moderate the
link between innovation and high social benefits and corporate social performance. We
add to these three areas of innovation research by examining what effect the manipulation
of earnings has on the expansion of innovative ideas.
The existence of earnings management is clearly demonstrated in the literature (e.g.,
Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Das, Shroff & Zhang, 2009; Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser,
1999; Hayn, 1995). Some limited empirical evidence also exists regarding the relationship
between firms adopting innovation focused strategies and their likelihood to manage
earnings. For example, Garcia and Young (2009) establish a link between managers
curtailing R&D in response to target driven earnings pressures. Their study uses a large
sample of R&D active United Kingdom firms.4 The results suggest that these R&D active
firms are more likely to manage earnings to meet certain earnings targets by limiting R&D
expenses. Several other studies in the literature have also shown that managers reduce
R&D spending to increase short-term performance (e.g., Cheng, 2004). Most recently
Shust (2015) examines and finds that the extent to which firms engage in research and
development or their R&D intensity level is positively associated with accrual-based
earnings management. This paper extends these studies by examining whether IS firms
use discretionary accruals and several other types of real activities (in addition to R&D
expenses) to manage or smooth earnings.
Management is motivated to manage earnings for a variety of reasons. Graham et al.
(2005) provides several reasons for earnings management to meet certain benchmarks.
The dominant reason relates to stock price. Skinner and Sloan (2002), for example,
document that there are severe negative price reactions when growth firms do not meet
earnings expectations. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document that managers avoid
reporting earnings decreases and losses to decrease costs imposed in transactions with
shareholders. Based on prospect theory, managers may be highly motivated to avoid
reporting a loss since the largest gains in utility occur when moving from an absolute loss
to a gain (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). Major consequences for missing earnings targets
are an increase in uncertainty about future prospects and the perception that missing
4 The criteria Garcia and Young (2009) use for R&D active firms are non-financial firms with at least three
consecutive years of non-zero R&D expenditure over a 13 year period. Garcia and Young (2009) focus their
tests exclusively on United Kingdom firms that expense all R&D as incurred.
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targets may be a sign of previously unknown problems at the firm (Graham, Harvey &
Rajgopal, 2005).
Despite its short term benefit, earnings management has future and long-term consequences.
Earnings management using real activities, such as delaying R&D expenditures, could have
a negative impact on future performance (Mizik, 2010). Degeorge et al. (1999) find that
the future performance of firms suspect for boosting earnings across a threshold is poorer
than other firms. Additionally, aggressive earnings management leading to accounting
scandals results in harsh consequences such as a significant drop in the value of equity
ownership, and severe penalties such as fines and sanctions imposed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, jail or probation time and job loss (Karpoff et al., 2008).
A common reason to manage earnings is to achieve a smoother earnings path. Earnings
smoothing, or a reduction of variability in reported earnings, is preferred by investors
(Barth et al., 1999) as evidenced by firms that smooth earnings being consistently priced
at a premium (DeAngelo et al., 1996). In fact, analysts reward firms that engage in
more aggressive earnings smoothing with higher Financial Analysts’ Federation (FAF)
disclosure scores (Shaw, 2003).
However, there are other reasons why firms smooth earnings. For example, managers at
firms that have their bonuses based on internal standards will manage earnings to meet but
not exceed budgeted performance thus achieving a smooth pattern of earnings (Murphy,
2001). Smoother earnings reduce the probability that firms will violate debt covenants
because, as part of a smoothing strategy, firms will manipulate earnings to meet the
thresholds outlined in the debt covenants (Blasco & Pelegrin, 2006). Smoother earnings
lead to an improvement in initial public offerings, stock financed acquisitions and the
overall financial conditions of many other operations as firms that that have shown to have
a consistent pattern of earnings are priced and valued by investors at a premium (Blasco
& Pelegrin, 2006).
Several studies indicate that firms willingly sacrifice value in order to improve reported
earnings. Mizik (2010) assesses the aggregate financial consequences of cutting marketing
as well as R&D spending to inflate earnings. Mizik (2010) contrasts the reduction of
these discretionary expenses to inflate earnings or myopic management with accounting
accruals-based earnings inflation and finds that myopia has a long-term net negative
impact on firm value. Mizik (2010) also shows that myopic management, and not accrualbased manipulation, has the greater negative impact on future financial performance.
Further, many top company executives concede that they are willing to reduce R&D and
advertising expenses even if that reduction in expenses would lead to a reduction in value
of the firm (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005). Dechow and Sloan (1991) similarly find
that when top executives are at the end of their tenure or when they are nearing retirement
at a firm, their firms exhibit a reduction in R&D spending.
Other related studies include Das, Shroff and Zhang (2009) which investigates whether the
pattern of quarterly earnings changes can provide an indication of earnings management.
They find that reversals of year to date earnings patterns in the fourth quarter occur more

24

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 19 | No. 1 | 2017

frequently than should be expected if the earnings reversals occurred purely by chance.
Several factors that were prevalent among firms with earnings reversals, including changes
in R&D expenditures, were indicative of earnings management.5 However, neither Das,
Shroff and Zhang (2009) nor Mizik (2010) examine firms with an overall innovation strategy.
Finally, previous research examines the relationship between R&D expenditures and meeting
earnings forecasts and targets (Garcia & Young, 2009), while other research studies the impact
that income smoothing has on earnings informativeness (Tucker & Zarowin, 2006).
2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
Several studies in prior literature suggest that IS firms would be more likely to manage
earnings than non-IS firms. First, Chaney, Devinney and Winer (1991) outline several
areas from conception of a new innovation to the public release of that innovation where
results from feasibility studies of new ideas, testing of new innovations, and sales of new
products or ideas in the marketplace could influence earnings, analyst earnings forecasts,
and other financial forecasts. Furthermore, profitability from innovative projects fluctuates
widely due to the risky nature of taking new ideas through to completion as a successful
product in the marketplace (see Marion & Friar, 2012). For example, Stevens and Burley
(1997) estimate that, on average, for every 100 exploratory projects where R&D expense
is incurred, only one successful product results.6 Since an innovative firm’s investment
in new products and processes is inherently risky, management may have more pressure
from the market to smooth earnings in order to reduce any aberrations in income as a
result of R&D expenses from failed projects and profits from successful projects. Second,
IS firms may be in need of large pools of capital to support new research projects. The need
for such capital may place pressure on management to inflate earnings to meet analysts’
expectations in order to receive the desired funding from investors (Fuller & Jensen,
2010). Because IS firms typically invest more capital in R&D and therefore face these
fundraising pressures (Garcia & Young, 2009), it is reasonable to expect that earnings
management might be used to attract capital to a greater degree than firms with low or
no R&D programs. Third, research indicates that the market does not fully reward firms
that engage in R&D. For example Ciftci, Lev and Radhakrishnan (2011) find that such
firms are underpriced by the market. Moreover, consistent with the underpricing of such
firms, Ali, Ciftci and Cready (2012) provide evidence that market participants undervalue
R&D expenditures. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that firms that find themselves
in this position would engage in earnings management to enhance their ability to attract
capital. Finally, prior literature has clearly demonstrated that R&D expenses provide the
opportunity for earnings management and have often been manipulated by management
to influence overall earnings (Bartov, 1993; Bens, Nagar & Franco-Wong, 2002; Bens et al.,
2003; Cohen, Dey & Lys, 2008).
5 Other factors Das, Shroff & Zhang (2009) find are prevalent among firms with earnings reversals include
the size and direction of discretionary accruals, the reversal of subsequent accruals, the use of special items
in the income statement, and the effective tax rate.
6 Stevens and Burley (1997) suggest that, on average, for every 3,000 raw ideas, there are 100 exploratory
projects, 10 well-developed projects, 2 full-fledged product launches and 1 successful product.
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We also consider the possibility, which enjoys very little support in the literature, that
IS firms might be less likely to manage earnings. First, when IS firms are in a startup
or growth phase they may place less emphasis on profitability than firms in the later
phases of the corporate life cycle (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983).
Miller and Friesen (1984) explain that firms in the early stages of the life cycle are more
innovative. Therefore, a firm in its early stages may be categorized as a IS firm when
profitability is low and then later in the corporate life cycle when profitability is high may
not be considered an IS firm. With this reduced emphasis on profitability, there would
be less pressure to manage earnings during these early organizational phases. Since firms
with a focus on innovation sometimes have negative earnings due to their startup nature,
earnings management could be less prevalent among IS firms than among non-IS firms.
Second, the motivation to manage earnings often stems from a need to raise capital. If an
IS firm already has available sources of funding for future projects, either through venture
capital or other profitable product lines, there would be less pressure to manage earnings
(Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005).
Although the literature cited above offers two scenarios under which IS firms might be
less likely to manage earnings, the current authors suggest that this evidence is weak. For
example, the first reason cited is that firms in their early stage life cycle would be less likely
to engage in earnings management because they would not be compelled to mask losses at
that point because such losses would be expected by market participants. We acknowledge
that this dynamic is possible; however there is no reason supported by the literature that
would indicate that IS firms are any less likely to manage earnings in that environment
than would be non-IS firms who are experiencing early life cycle losses. Therefore we find
no reason to suspect that earnings management would be less likely in IS firms under
those circumstances. The second reason cited above for less likely earnings management
is that IS firms often obtain private venture capital to fund operations and thus have no
need to raise capital through traditional public debt or equity sources. Therefore in the
absence of such a need there would be no incentive to manage earnings. Although this
scenario is likely true for some IS firms, there is no indication in the literature that IS firms
have any less of a need for capital beyond private sources than do non-IS firms.
Because the reasons for expecting less earnings management among IS firms are not
strongly supported by the literature, and because of the strong indications in prior
literature cited above that suggest a positive relationship exists between IS firms and
earnings management, we test the following hypotheses stated in the alternate form:
H1. Earnings smoothing is more prevalent among IS firms than among non-IS firms.
H2. Use of real activities to manipulate earnings is more prevalent among IS firms
than among non-IS firms.
H3. Use of discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings is more prevalent among
IS firms than among non-IS firms.
To test the hypotheses, three earnings management approaches are examined. The first
approach (to test H1) is to investigate whether income smoothing exists. Prior research
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has examined income smoothing as evidence for earnings management (Matsuura,
2008; Shaw, 2003). Murphy (2001) examined the proportion of net income derived from
the fourth quarter relative to the proportion of net income derived from the first three
quarters of the fiscal year. Therefore, we test whether IS firms derive a greater (or smaller)
proportion of income from the fourth quarter relative to non-IS firms.
The second approach (to test H2) is to test for the use of real activities by IS firms. One
method that firms use to manage earnings through real activities is to reduce discretionary
expenditures such as R&D expenses (Cardinal & Opler, 1995) and advertising and
marketing expenses (Mizik, 2010). Roychowdhury (2006) develops empirical methods
to detect real activity-based earnings management including cash flow from operations
(CFO), production costs, and discretionary expenses. Roychowdhury (2006) argues
that these variables capture the effect of real operations better than accruals. Then, these
measures are used to detect real activities manipulation around the zero earnings and
annual analyst forecasts thresholds. In a subsequent study (Cohen, Dey & Lys, 2008)
also uses the Roychowdhury (2006) proxies for real-activity earnings management.
Furthermore, other real activities that might be used to manipulate income include certain
special items (Das, Shroff & Zhang, 2009) such as the delay of new product introductions
and by offering certain customer incentives to boost product sales (Graham, Harvey &
Rajgopal, 2005).7
Finally the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings is examined (to test H3), which
is the most commonly used measure to identify earnings management.8 Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) document the existence of earnings management and indicate that besides
using real activities, firms also use accruals to manage earnings. Discretionary accruals
are normally identified using the modified “Jones Model” (Jones, 1991) as described in
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), and Cohen, Dey
and Lys (2008).9 The original Jones Model estimates accruals as a function of a change in
revenue and a change in property, plant and equipment. Then discretionary accruals are
computed as the difference between the actual and predicted values of total assets. Since a
higher than predicted level of discretionary accruals is an indicator that a firm might have
engaged in earnings management, this equation computes discretionary accruals as the
difference between the actual and the predicted value of total accruals.

7 Some special items could be used to manipulate income through accruals (i.e. write-downs of assets), some
special items may be examples of real activity manipulation (i.e. non-recurring profit or loss on the sale of
assets, investments, securities, among others) while others may be examples of either accrual or real activity
manipulation (i.e. any significant nonrecurring items).
8 A recent study by Stubben (2010) finds that discretionary revenues can also be used to determine the level of
earnings management a firm has engaged in. In fact, his study finds that revenue models are more likely than
accrual models to indicate a combination of revenue and expense manipulation. Additionally, Dechow et al.
(2012) develop a new approach for detecting earnings management that improves test power and specification. This new approach utilizes the information contained in the reversals of accruals to improve the power
of testing for earnings by over 40%.
9 Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995) find the modified Jones Model to exhibit the most power in detecting
earnings management.
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2.1. Measurement of Innovation
Several previous papers use various approaches to measure innovation. Some commonly
used proxies for innovation include R&D expenses (e.g., Cardinal & Opler, 1995; Ittner,
Larcker & Rajan, 1997), number of patents (e.g., Francis & Smith, 1995; Holthausen,
Larcker & Sloan, 1995), and new product releases (Cardinal & Opler, 1995; Ittner, Larcker
& Rajan, 1997). Less commonly used proxies for innovation include the number of
innovation-related press releases (Koku, 2010), revenue and income from acquisitions
(Francis & Smith, 1995), and the ratio of capital expenditures to sales (Francis & Smith,
1995). Closely related measures of innovation include Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997)
measures of firm growth and firm efficiency measured using market to book value and the
number of employees to sales, respectively.
Following prior studies (e.g., Cardinal & Opler, 1995; Ittner, Larcker & Rajan, 1997), R&D
expenses (Compustat XRD) are used to proxy for innovation. In order to operationalize
R&D expenses as a proxy for innovation, the median value of R&D expenses scaled by total
assets for each industry or 2-digit SIC code are computed. A dummy variable indicating
high and low levels of R&D expenses for each firm-year is utilized. The variable indicates
whether the firm’s preceding three years average level of R&D spending is above or below
the median value for each industry during the preceding three years.
2.2. Research Methodology
Three equations are used to test each of the approaches described in section 3.1. To test
for income smoothing, the first equation is based on Murphy (2001) who identifies firms
smoothing income in the fourth quarter. The following empirical equation is employed:
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1) (1)

where, for each firm i and year t:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

(2)

Qtr4 is the percent of annual net income (Compustat NI) derived from the fourth quarter;

YTDDIFF
is1 the difference
income (Compustat NI) through the first three quarters
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼net
(3)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2in
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 � �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
in year t with the net
income through the first three quarters in year t-1;

1
INNOV
variable
one
if the three year mean of R&D spending in(4)
years
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
� + equal
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖to
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is=a𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽dummy
1 � �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
t-3, t-2, and t-1 (Compustat
XRD) scaled by total assets (Compustat AT) is above the
industry median in years t-3, t-2, and t-1; otherwise, it is equal to zero;

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
AGE is the number of
years𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
since
the
initial public offering of the firm;
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(5)

MTB is the market value of the firm (Compustat MKVALT) divided by the book value of

𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
= 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 (Compustat
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄CEQ);
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
the𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 firm
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

(6)

MKTVAL is the market value of equity (Compustat MKVALM); and Industry represent
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0variables
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
− ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(7)
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 (∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖SIC
dummy
to indicate
code
categories.
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) +
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 � + two-digit

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽8 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(8)
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This equation examines whether firms with innovation focused strategies smooth earnings
by artificially inflating or reducing the fourth quarter income once the income through
the first three quarters of the year is known. Absent of earnings management and seasonal
fluctuations in business activity, the dependent variable, Qtr4, would approximate onequarter of a firm’s annual net income because Qtr4 is the percent of annual net income
(Compustat NI) derived from the fourth quarter. Prior literature has shown that due to
income smoothing, higher income through the first three quarters of the current year
compared to income during the same period in the prior year has a downward effect on
the fourth quarter’s earnings as firms exceeding their targets in the first three quarters
may adjust their fourth-quarter accruals downward to “save” for the future (Das,
Shroff & Zhang, 2009; Murphy, 2001). For firm with net income, this would result in a
negative coefficient on the YTDDIFF variable. Furthermore, because of the larger pool of
marketing and R&D expenses in IS firms, the expectation of this study is that those firms
will be more likely to smooth earnings than non-IS firms (Das, Shroff & Zhang, 2009;
Mizik, 2010). For observations with annual net income, the coefficient on the interaction
term YTDDIFF*INNOV is also expected to be negative. Such a result would indicate that
IS firms smooth earnings by decreasing earnings to a greater extent during the fourth
quarter. Conversely, for firms with annual net loss, the coefficient on both the YTDDIFF
and the interaction would be expected to be positive. This result for firms with a net loss
would indicate that they smooth their losses by increasing losses in the fourth quarter
when their losses through the first three quarters of the current year are smaller than that
of the same period in the prior year.
The second equation tests management’s use of real activities. Under this method,
following Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008), three tests for abnormal activities are performed:
abnormal cash flow from operations; abnormal production costs; and abnormal
discretionary expenses. Discretionary expenses are defined as the sum of advertising
expenses, R&D expenses, and selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses. Each
model measures the deviation from the predicted value in the corresponding industryyear regression. Although capitalization of development costs could have an impact on
real activities earnings management and thus increase the deviation from predicted values
in equation (4) below, because the firms in our sample generally use U.S. GAAP which
precludes capitalization of such costs with narrow exceptions for software and website
development costs, we expect any impact to be diminutive. Therefore following Cohen,
Dey & Lys (2008) the normal levels of cash flow from operations, production costs, and
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽expenses
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖flow
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 from
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 operations
+
discretionary
generated
by𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4first
estimating
normal
2 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖are
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽05 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1

(1)

(2)(2)

(2)
(3)

(3)(3)
(4)
(4)

(5)
(5)

𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄

� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀

2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
5
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
N. JEPPSON, D. SALERNO𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
| INNOVATION
FOCUSED
STRATEGY
AND
EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT
...

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

Next, the normal level of discretionary expenses (DiscExp) is modeled as:

� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

(1)
(2)

29

(3)
(4)
(4)

In these equations, CFO (Compustat OANCF – XIDOC) is as reported in the statement
of cash flows,
total assets (Compustat AT); MV is the natural log of market value
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴scaled
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽by
0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 + PRCCM
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3+𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +(PRCCM
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6CSHO)
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + + (5)
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + *
(Compustat
*𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖CSHO);
Q 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is
Tobin’s
PSTK
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
+
5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀Q
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +(Compustat
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(1)
+ DT + DLC) scaled by total assets; Sales is net sales (Compustat SALE) scaled by total
assets; Prod represents
the production costs, defined as the sum of Cost of Goods Sold
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
�1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
(6)
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
11 COGS)
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
(Compustat
and
in3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄inventory
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
+ 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 scaled by total assets;
(2)
+
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽change
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 � �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(Compustat
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖INVT)
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
DiscExp represents the discretionary expenditures, defined as the sum of advertising
expenses
(Compustat
expenses (Compustat XRD), and selling, general
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄XAD),
(7)and
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽R&D
2 (∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
+ 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is internal
(3)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 � �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖XSGA)
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
5by total
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 assets,
6
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
administrative
expenses
scaled
and
INT
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 � +(Compustat
funds (Compustat IB + XRD + DP). Abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, and
abnormal discretionary
expenses
are𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 computed
as the difference
between
the 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖actual values
+ 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌+
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+
4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀+
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
(4)
+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽22𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 == 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽10�+1�𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
3 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖predicted
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(4).
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴These
(8) are
and the normal
levels
equations
(3),
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖from
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽8 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌(2),
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 three variables
then used as proxies for real activity earnings management in the following equation:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(5)

(5)

where for each firm i and year t:

𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄

� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(6)

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
Abnormal Activity is one
of three measures of abnormal activity: abnormal cash flow
from operations, abnormal production costs; or abnormal discretionary expenses;

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 (∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(7)

Bench is an indicator variable that is set equal to one if (a) net income divided by total
assets is between 0 and 0.01, or (b) the change in net income divided by total assets
between=t –𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽10 +
and
between
0 and 0.01, zero otherwise;
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌t𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼is𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽8 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Big is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm;

(8)

∆GDP is the change in gross domestic product (Compustat GDP);
Industry represent dummy variables to indicate two-digit SIC code categories; and
Year is dummy variables to control for year effects.
All other variables are defined as in prior equations.
As in Gunny (2010), we include the indicator variable, Bench, which identifies firms
that have just met one or both of two earnings benchmarks. These two benchmarks are
earnings that are just above zero or earnings that are just above the prior year’s earnings.
We also interact this indicator variable for earnings benchmarks with the test variable for
innovation. A significant result on the interaction term would indicate IS firms engage in
incrementally different earnings management behavior.
For given sales levels, firms that manage earnings upward are likely to have unusually high
or low cash flow from operations, unusually low discretionary expenses, or unusually high
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production costs. Either unusually high or low cash flow from operations could indicate
earnings management. Unusually high cash flow may result from the reduction of cash
expenses. Unusually low cash flow from operations could result from the acceleration of
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄4 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
sales𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖through
price discounts or lenient credit terms (Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008). Therefore
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(1)
the expectation is that the coefficient of INNOV and the interaction between INNOV and
Bench in Equation (5) will be either positive or negative for abnormal cash flow, negative
1 discretionary
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖production costs. Such
(2) a
for 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖abnormal
expense
abnormal
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 � �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖and
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽positive
4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +for
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 � + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
result would indicate that innovative firms manage earnings by manipulating these real
activities more than other firms in periods when a change in these income statement items
1
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +terms
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆of
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴financing
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 analysts’
(3)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 � �the
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +favorable
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴or
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 � + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
will 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖increase
likelihood
of 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖receiving
to +
meet
earnings targets.
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄

� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

+ 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀

(4)

2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
5
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
The third equation is𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
used to
test
the
extent
to
which
IS
firms
engage in earnings
management by using discretionary accruals. As suggested by Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008),
the equation is developed by starting with the Jones Model (Equation 6) for determining
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
discretionary accruals.
Discretionary accruals are computed as the difference between
the
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(5)
actual
and
predicted
values
as 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌follows:
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽of
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖accruals
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼total

𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
where for each firm𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
i and year
t:
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 (∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

(1)

(6)(6)

(2)
(7)

TA is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets (Compustat AT) where total accruals is
(3)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �61�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � +7 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1(Compustat SALE) scaled by lagged total assets; and
∆Sales is change in sales

(8)
(4)

PPE is net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat PPEGT) scaled by lagged total

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
assets. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(5)

Then, following Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) the coefficient estimates obtained in
Equation
(6) are
firm-specific
1 used to �estimate
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 normal accruals (NAit) for the sample
(6)
+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆the
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 � �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
firms:
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �1�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 (∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

(7) (7)

where for each firm i and year t:
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(8)

∆AR is change in accounts receivable (Compustat RECT) scaled by lagged total assets.
All other variables are defined as in prior equations.
The discretionary accruals variable (DA) is computed as the difference between TA and
NA and is used as the dependent variable in the following equation:

(5)
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1

(6)
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(8)

(8)

where for each firm i and year t:

Accruals is defined as one of three measures of discretionary accruals (DA): (1) the
absolute value of discretionary accruals, (2) positive discretionary accruals, or (3) negative
discretionary accruals.
All other variables are defined as in prior equations.
It is anticipated that the coefficient on the interaction INNOV*Bench in Equation (8) will
be significant. Such a result for each of the three measures of discretionary accruals would
suggest that accrual based earnings management is more prevalent among IS firms than
among non-IS firms.
3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes the two samples used in this study: a smoothing sample, and an
earnings management sample.
Table 1 - Innovation Strategy Sample Selection Procedures
Selection Procedure
Total number of firm year observations
in Compustat
Less: Non-innovative industries
Less: Extreme fourth-quarter incomea
Final sample

Smoothing
Data

Earnings
Management Data

20,055

19,791

--(4,006)
16,049b

8,506
--11,285

a
Consistent with prior literature, observations are eliminated that contain fourthquarter income shares less than zero or exceeding unity.

In Tables 2 & 3, for ease of interpretation this final sample is split into two groups,
observations with annual net income and annual net loss, with sample sizes of 7,750
and 8,299, respectively.
b

Each of the two data samples initially includes all available Compustat observations from
1991 to 2010. For the smoothing data set, we begin with all available observations. First,
we eliminate observations with missing variables. Then, following Murphy (2001), firms
with fourth quarter net losses or firms where fourth quarter income exceeds unity are
eliminated. This results in a final sample size of 16,049.10 For the earnings management
sample, we begin with all available observations. Then, in order to focus our tests on
10 The smoothing data sample is not reduced to these eight industries in order to preserve a reasonable final
sample size. Therefore, all industries are included in the smoothing data sample.
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industries where innovation plays a key role in management strategy, we eliminate firms
that are not in innovative industries (e.g., Collins, Maydew, & Weiss, 1997; Dechow &
Sloan, 1991; Francis & Schipper, 1999; Lev & Sougiannis, 1996). Innovative industries
are defined following Cao and Laksmana (2010) as either R&D intensive, intangibleintensive, or high-tech.11 This results in the inclusion of firms from 137 different four-digit
SIC coded industries in our earnings management sample. These procedures result in a
final sample size of 11,285 for the earnings management data set.
3.1 Smoothing Data Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for each of the variables used in
the smoothing data tests. Panels A and B present descriptive statistics and correlations for
observations with annual net income, while Panels C and D present descriptive statistics
and correlations for observations with annual net loss. In order to differentiate between
their distinct set of incentives, we split the smoothing sample into two subsamples. The first
includes firms with annual net income and the second includes firms with annual net loss.
Firms with annual net income are motivated to smooth their annual net income by reducing
fourth quarter income when income through the first three quarters of the current year
exceeds income through the same period in the prior year (Murphy, 2001). This results in
the percentage share of net income being smaller for firms with net income that engage in
earnings smoothing. Therefore the coefficient on the YTDDIFF variable and the interaction
term for firm with net income that smooth earnings would be expected to be negative.
Firms with annual net losses are less motivated to smooth income due to less emphasis on
profitability (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984). Still, if firms with annual net losses do engage in
earnings management, their fourth quarter loss will make up a larger portion of annual net
loss. Therefore the coefficient on the YTDDIFF variable and the interaction term for firm
with net loss that smooth earnings would be expected to be positive.12
In Panel A of Table 2, the dependent variable, Qtr4, has a mean (median) value of 0.327
(0.290) and a standard deviation of 0.181. If earnings were distributed evenly across the
four quarters of the year, the expected value of Qtr4 would be 0.25. Therefore, on average,
11 These industries and corresponding two-digit SIC codes are: (1) chemical and allied products - 28; (2)
machinery - 35; (3) electric and electric supplies - 36; (4) transportation equipment - 37; (5) measuring and
photographic goods - 38; (6) communications - 48; (7) business service - 73; and (8) engineering, accounting
and related service - 87. Cao and Laksmana (2010) note that each of these industries were identified as R&D
intensive, intangible-intensive or high-tech industries by Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997), Dechow and
Sloan (1991), Francis and Schipper (1999), and Lev and Sougiannis (1996).
12 This may best be explained by using a numerical example. If during the prior year, a given firm experiences
a loss of $750 through the first three quarters and then has losses in the fourth quarter of $250, the annual loss
would be $1,000, with the fourth quarter comprising 25% of the annual loss. Then, if during the first three
quarters of the current year, the firm experiences a loss of only $650, the value of the loss in the current year
is smaller than the same period of the prior year. Then, in order to match the prior year annual loss of $1,000,
the firm may have losses of $350, or 35% of the annual loss. Therefore, as described, firms with annual net
losses that have a smaller loss through the first three quarters of the year compared to the prior year’s first
three quarters, will have a fourth quarter loss that makes up a larger portion of the current year’s loss when
the firm is smoothing earnings.
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the observations in the sample have 31% higher earnings than would be expected if
earnings were distributed evenly throughout the fiscal year.
Similarly, the variable, YTDDIFF, has a mean (median) value of 25.76 (3.011) and a
standard deviation of 653.1. If earnings were consistent from one year to the next (no
growth in earnings from the prior year), the expected value of YTDDIFF would be zero,
indicating that it is equally likely that earnings through the first three quarters of the year
would be higher or lower than the first three quarters of the previous year.
In Panel B of Table 2, both the AGE variable and MTB variable have significant Spearman
correlations (Pearson only AGE variable correlation is significant) to the INNOV test
variable. The Spearman (Pearson) correlation between the test variable INNOV and the
control variables AGE is negative at -0.075 (-0.064) while the test variable’s correlation
with MTB is positive at 0.129 (0.008).
The descriptive statistics and correlations for observations with annual net loss as shown
in Panels C and D of Table 2 are similar to those with annual net income with only a few
exceptions. The mean (median) value for YTDDIFF is negative at -22.05 (-0.978) indicating
that loss firms typically perform better in the first three quarters of the prior period than the
current period. Also, the mean (median) value for INNOV is much higher at 0.400 (0.000)
indicating that there are more innovative firms on average that have a net loss for the period.
In untabulated results regarding the smoothing sample, we find that the average age of IS
firms is 15.1 years, while the average age of non-IS firms is 16.2 years. Therefore, on average,
an IS firm is on average 7% younger than non-IS firms in the smoothing sample.
Table 3 presents the results of our tests of income smoothing regarding fourth-quarter
shares of net income on year-to-date income (relative to the prior year) including
interactions for innovative firm strategy. Panel A presents results for observations with
annual net income while Panel B presents results for observations with annual net loss.
The first column of Panel A in Table 3 presents the regression results of Equation (1)
excluding the control variables for industry, age, and growth while the second column
presents the regression results for the entire equation. In both cases, the coefficients for
YTDDIFF are negative and significant indicating that firms smooth annual net income by
decreasing reported earnings in the fourth quarter of their fiscal year if earnings through
the first three quarters of the fiscal year exceed earnings through the same period of
the prior year. This result for the variable YTDDIFF is consistent with Murphy (2001).
In both regressions, the coefficients for INNOV are positive and significant, indicating
that IS firms have higher earnings during the fourth quarter of their fiscal year when
compared to non-IS firms. This indicates that IS firms report a greater percentage of their
income during the fourth quarter of the year than do other firms, providing evidence
for H1. Therefore, IS firms smooth their income to a greater extent than other firms by
manipulating their fourth quarter income upward. The coefficient for the INNOV variable
suggests that IS firms report 4.2% more income than other firms, for a total of 39.2% of
their annual income, during the fourth quarter of the year. Furthermore, the coefficients of
the interactive variable of YTDDIFF and INNOV are negative and significant, suggesting
that smoothing does occur to a greater extent during years where their income is higher
though the first three quarters of the year.
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The first column of Panel B in Table 3 presents the regression results of Equation (1)
excluding the control variables for industry, age, and growth while the second column
presents the regression results for the entire equation. In each regression, the coefficients
for YTDDIFF are significant, suggesting that loss firms do report a significantly different
portion of their loss during the fourth quarter when the current year’s loss is through
the first three quarters of the year is smaller than that of the first three quarters in the
prior period. Similarly, in both regressions, the coefficients for INNOV are negative and
significant indicating that IS firms that have an annual net loss experience a fourth quarter
that makes up a smaller share of their annual net loss than that of non-IS firms. This result
supports H1 and indicates that IS firms are managing their income more than non-IS
firms by reporting smaller losses during the fourth quarter of the year, thus decreasing
their annual loss. However, the coefficient on the interaction variable YTDDIFF*INNOV
is not significant. 13
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for smoothing data set for the period from 1994-2010
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for observations with annual net income (Sample size is
7,750)
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard
deviation

25th
Percentile

75th
Percentile

Qtr4

0.327

0.290

0.181

0.224

0.391

YTDDIFF

25.76

3.011

653.1

-0.333

14.23

INNOV

0.105

0.000

0.307

0.000

0.000

AGE

16.63

16.00

4.931

14.00

19.00

MTB

4.344

2.454

79.03

1.505

4.045

MKTVAL

2,532

563.4

11,060

145.6

1667

Panel B: Spearman/Pearson correlations for observations with annual net
income
Qtr4

YTDDIFF

INNOV

AGE

MTB

MKTVAL

---

-0.018

0.059

-0.042

0.001

-0.026

YTDDIFF

-0.095

---

-0.005

0.010

0.000

0.155

INNOV

0.055

0.024

---

-0.064

0.008

-0.001

AGE

-0.053

-0.020

-0.075

---

0.006

0.054

MTB

0.120

0.204

0.129

-0.033

---

0.011

MKTVAL

-0.030

0.340

-0.113

0.022

0.420

---

Variable
Qtr4

Spearman is on the bottom left, Pearson is on top right. Bold text indicates significance
at the 0.1 level or better.
13 In untabulated results, when controlling for the previous year’s fourth quarter percent of annual net income (Compustat NI), results are unchanged.
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Table 2 (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for observations with annual net loss (Sample size is 8,299)
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard
deviation

25th
Percentile

75th
Percentile

Qtr4
0.334
0.279
0.212
0.196
0.422
YTDDIFF -22.05
-0.978
890.3
-7.876
1.586
INNOV
0.400
0.000
0.490
0.000
1.000
AGE
15.28
15.00
4.592
12.00
18.00
MTB
4.803
1.805
112.3
0.622
4.546
MKTVAL
348.0
63.93
2,492
16.03
209.4
Panel D: Spearman/Pearson correlations for observations with annual net loss
Variable
Qtr4
YTDDIFF
INNOV
AGE
MTB
MKTVAL
Qtr4
--0.008
-0.129
0.078
-0.010
0.012
YTDDIFF
0.039
--0.004
-0.009
0.001
-0.261
INNOV
-0.102
0.118
---0.062
-0.008
-0.033
AGE
0.099
-0.022
-0.076
---0.007
0.010
MTB
-0.053
0.023
0.104
-0.035
--0.010
MKTVAL
-0.018
-0.230
-0.064
-0.157
0.380
--Spearman is on the bottom left, Pearson is on top right. Bold text indicates significance
at the 0.1 level or better.
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Table 3 Coefficients of OLS regressions of fourth-quarter share of net income on yearto-date income (relative to prior year), with interactions for innovative firm strategy
from 1994 to 2010.
Panel A: Observations with annual net income

Independent variablesa
Intercept

Dependent variable: Qtr4
Coefficient
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
(t-statistic)
0.327
(148.4)***

0.377
(61.76)***

YTDDIFFb

-0.263
(-9.02)***

-0.256
(-7.15)***

INNOV

0.046
(5.07)***

0.045
(4.80)***

YTDDIFF * INNOV

-0.001
(-2.79)***

-0.001
(-2.79)***

AGE

-0.001
(-2.95)***

MTB

0.003
(4.67)***

MKTVAL

-0.000
(-0.93)

Industry Controls

Included

# of observations

7,750

7,750

Adjusted R2

0.013

0.032

***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
a
Continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to ensure results
are not sensitive to extreme observations.
b
Values for this variable have been multiplied by one thousand for ease of
interpretation.
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Table 3 (continued)
Panel B: Observations with annual net loss

Independent variablesa

Dependent variable: Qtr4
Coefficient
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
(t-statistic)

Intercept

0.361
(108.8)***

0.409
(59.90)***

YTDDIFFb

0.286
(7.18)***

0.351
(8.37)***

INNOV

-0.060
(-13.18)***

-0.050
(-11.12)***

YTDDIFF * INNOVb

-0.236
(-1.06)

0.279
(-1.26)

AGE

0.004
(6.68)***

MTB

-0.001
(-3.57)***

MKTVALb

0.007
(4.02)***

Industry Controls

Included

# of observations

8,299

8,299

Adjusted R

0.023

0.046

2

***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to ensure results
are not sensitive to extreme observations.
a

Mean
0.001

-0.126

-0.265

1.007

-0.053

0.226

0.468

0.735

240.5

2,830

15.62

2.853

Variable
AbCFO

AbPROD

AbDISCEXP

ABSDA

DA

INNOV

Bench

Big

ChgGDP

MKTVAL

AGE

MTB
2.137

15.00

247.4

312.0

1.000

0.000

0.000

0.027

0.104

-0.251

-0.099

Median
0.068

Panel A: Descriptive statistics (Sample size is 11,285)

67.28

5.448

12,879

255.6

0.441

0.499

0.418

14.87

14.84

7.149

2.429

Standard
deviation
2.774

1.137

12.00

46.10

167.9

0.000

0.000

0.000

-0.070

0.044

-0.469

-0.248

25th Percentile
-0.176

Table 4 Descriptive statistics for earnings management data set for the period from 1994-2010

3.928

31.00

1,107

375.0

1.000

1.000

0.000

0.133

0.244

0.019

0.064

75th Percentile
0.260
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(A)b

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

(G)

(H)

(I)

(A)
---0.325
-0.665
0.050
-0.025
-0.061
0.048
0.051
0.017
(B)
-0.292
--0.620
-0.133
0.017
-0.022
0.025
0.023
0.020
(C)
-0.291
-0.410
---0.048
-0.041
0.057
-0.018
0.006
-0.017
(D)
-0.151
-0.047
0.130
---0.070
0.000
-0.022
-0.052
-0.006
(E)
-0.052
-0.028
-0.035
0.177
--0.013
-0.004
-0.009
-0.029
(F)
-0.217
-0.184
0.470
0.112
-0.014
---0.229
-0.062
0.017
(G)
0.356
0.010
-0.403
-0.147
0.131
-0.229
--0.181
0.054
(H)
0.348
-0.063
-0.175
-0.189
-0.073
-0.062
0.181
--0.042
(I)
0.031
0.061
-0.047
0.033
0.005
0.024
0.063
0.053
--(J)
0.726
-0.169
-0.384
-0.194
-0.052
-0.208
0.369
0.514
0.029
(K)
-0.091
0.137
-0.100
-0.049
-0.028
-0.046
0.072
-0.053
0.196
(L)
0.276
-0.203
0.011
0.009
0.033
0.081
0.107
0.139
-0.193
a
Spearman is on the bottom left, Pearson is on top right. Bold text indicates significance at the 0.1 level or better.
b
Column and row headings:
(A) AbCFO
(B) AbPROD
(C) AbDISCEXP
(D) ABSDA
(E) DA
(F) INNOV
(G) Bench
(H) Big
(I) ChgGDP
(J) MKTVAL
(K) AGE
(L) MTB

Variable

Table 4 (continued)
Panel B: Spearman/Pearson correlationsa
(J)
0.037
-0.007
-0.000
-0.010
0.000
-0.065
0.094
0.118
0.020
---0.016
0.398

(K)
-0.013
0.027
0.002
-0.022
0.012
-0.043
0.072
-0.040
0.155
0.090
--0.012

(L)
0.003
-0.001
-0.001
-0.011
0.011
0.010
-0.002
0.011
-0.001
0.010
-0.009
---
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3.2 Earnings Management (Real Activities and Discretionary Accruals)
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for each of the variables used
in the earnings management sample for tests regarding both accrual based earnings
management and real activity management. Panel A of Table 4, which provides descriptive
statistics, shows that while the mean (median) value for DA (the difference between total
accruals and fitted normal accruals) is near zero at -0.053 (0.027), the mean (median)
value for ABSDA (the absolute value of the difference between total accruals and fitted
normal accruals) is 1.007 (0.104). Since the ABSDA variable captures the discretionary
accruals regardless of the direction of the accrual, the magnitude of the mean value of
ABSDA is far larger than the mean value of DA.
In Panel B of Table 4, each of the measures for real activities management have significant
Pearson (Spearman) correlations with the INNOV test variable. The Pearson (Spearman)
correlation is also significant (significant for AbCFO and AbDISCEXP, but not AbPROD)
for each of the measures of real activities management with the Bench indicator variable.
The Spearman (Pearson) correlations are also significant for ABSDA with both INNOV
and Bench (significant for INNOV but not Bench). In untabulated results regarding the
earnings management sample, we find that the average age of IS firms is 15.2 years, while
the average age of non-IS firms is 15.7 years. Therefore, on average, an IS firm is on average
3% younger than non-IS firms in the earnings management sample.
Table 5 presents the test results of the association between IS firms and real activities
earnings management. The first two columns present the coefficients and t-statistics for
Equation (5) with AbCFO as the dependent variable, columns 3 and 4 provide results with
AbPROD as the dependent variable, and columns 5 and 6 present results with AbDISCEXP
as the dependent variable.
Results indicate that among IS firms, real activity earnings management is present for
both the AbCFO and the AbDISCEXP equations. The dummy variable, INNOV, is positive
and significant at 0.621 when AbDISCEXP is the dependent variable in Equation (5). This
indicates that IS firms incur more discretionary expenses than non-IS firms. As is the case
in prior literature, firms overall are likely to manage income by manipulating discretionary
expenses when close to earnings benchmarks. Consistent with such manipulation, we
find a significant negative result for the coefficient of Bench at -0.216. Consistent with our
hypothesis, we find that IS firms manage income to a greater extent than non-IS firms by
decreasing discretionary expenses to increase income as the coefficient for INNOV *Bench
is also negative and significant at -0.213.
We find similar indications of earnings management by IS firms by testing abnormal
cash flows from operations, AbCFO. We find using AbCFO as the dependent variable in
Equation (5) that the coefficient for INNOV is -0.255 indicating that IS firms normally have
less cash flows from operations than non-IS firms likely due to having incurred more R&D
expenses than other firms. Furthermore, IS firms have higher cash flows from operations
when earnings are close to zero or approach last year’s reported earnings as shown in
Table 5 by the significant coefficient of 0.251 for the interaction INNOV*Bench. Results for
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Equation (5) using AbPROD as the dependent variable also indicate real activity earnings
management for IS firms. Therefore, our tests regarding AbCFO and AbPROD provide
further evidence for H2.
Table 5 Innovative Strategy and Determinants of Real Activities Earnings
Management from 1994 to 2010

Intercept

AbCFO
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
-0.290 (-9.24)***

INNOV

-0.255

(-17.63)***

-0.133

Bench

0.145

(19.95)***

0.024

INNOV*Bench

0.251

(14.04)***

Big

0.267

(26.29)***

Independent
variablesa

ChgGDP

b

MKTVALb

-0.000

(-0.01)

AbPROD
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
0.044 (1.87)*

0.621

(33.05)***

(4.21)***

-0.216

(-25.12)***

-0.098

(-7.20)***

-0.213

(-9.40)***

-0.042

(-5.82)***

-0.151

(-12.07)***

(1.37)

-0.007

0.031

0.011

(28.11)***

-0.005

AGE

-0.006

(-8.87)***

0.002

MTB

0.004

(5.16)***

-0.002

(-15.21)***

AbDISCEXP
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
-0.126 (-3.31)***

(-16.09)***

(-0.17)

0.002

(2.58)***

(3.68)***

-0.005

(-5.49)***

(-3.87)***

0.002

(1.52)

Industry
controls

Included

Included

Included

Year-by-year
controls

Included

Included

Included

# of
observations

11,285

11,285

11,285

Adjusted R2

0.298

0.238

0.356

***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Continuous variables (including dependent variables) have been winsorized at the 1%
and 99% levels to ensure results are not sensitive to extreme observations.
a

Values for this variable have been multiplied by one thousand for ease of interpretation.

b
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Table 6 Innovative Strategy and Determinants of Accrual Based Earnings
Management from 1994 to 2010
ABSDA
Coefficient
(t-statistic)

Positive DA
Coefficient
(t-statistic)

Negative DA
Coefficient
(t-statistic)

Intercept

0.919 (6.61)***

0.467 (3.56)***

-0.638 (-5.63)***

INNOV

0.101 (2.93)***

0.062 (1.43)

-0.148 (-4.64)***

Bench

-0.053 (-1.98)**

-0.053 (-1.72)*

0.040 (1.68)*

INNOV*Bench

-0.137 (-2.43)**

-0.111 (-1.72)*

0.125 (2.33)**

Big

-0.237 (-7.77)***

-0.193 (-5.87)***

0.221 (7.26)***

Independent
variablesa

ChgGDP

0.161 (1.43)

0.029 (0.32)

-0.001 (-1.22)

-0.001 (-0.70)

0.000 (0.24)

AGE

0.002 (0.72)

0.001 (0.42)

-0.003 (-1.50)

MTB

-0.001 (-0.52)

0.001 (0.34)

0.001 (0.58)

b

MKTVAL

b

-0.255 (-2.04)**

Industry controls

Included

Included

Included

Year-by-year
controls

Included

Included

Included

# of
observations

11,285

6,548

4,737

Adjusted R2

0.189

0.271

0.155

***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
a
Continuous variables (including dependent variables) have been winsorized at the
1% and 99% levels to ensure results are not sensitive to extreme observations.

Values for this variable have been multiplied by one thousand for ease of interpretation.

b

Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equation (8) to examine the use of discretionary
accruals in IS firms. The first column presents the coefficients and t-statistics ABSDA as
the dependent variable. The second and third columns present regression results with
Positive DA and Negative DA as the dependent variables.
Overall, the results in Table 6 provide evidence that, in addition to using real activities,
IS firms use accruals to manage earnings to a greater extent than do non-IS firms. The
coefficient on INNOV in Equation (8) where ABSDA is the dependent variable is positive
and significant at 0.101. This suggests that IS firms use discretionary accruals to manage
earnings more than their non-IS firm counterparts thus supporting H3. The coefficient
for the interaction term is negative and significant indicating that less accruals are used
to manage earnings when the firm’s earnings are close to the earnings benchmarks of
positive earnings and the prior year’s earnings, again supporting H3.
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Further, Table 6 provides results of tests for positive and negative discretionary accruals.
Table 6 indicates that while the coefficient for INNOV with Positive DA as the dependent
variable in Equation (8) is not significant, the coefficient for INNOV with Negative
DA as the dependent variable in Equation (8) is significant at -0.148 indicating that IS
firms utilize less negative discretionary accruals and thus supports H3. The interaction
term for positive discretionary accruals is negative and marginally significant at -0.111,
and the interaction terms is positive and significant at 0.125 for negative discretionary
accruals. These results indicate that while IS firms utilize more discretionary accruals
than other firms, it may occur to a lesser extent when IS firms earnings are near the
earnings benchmarks of positive income or the prior year’s income. This is likely due to
a focus on other earnings benchmarks such as analysts’ earnings forecasts (DeGeorge,
Patel & Zeckhauser, 1999) or targets for specific executive compensation components
(Holthausen, Larcker & Sloan, 1995).
3.3 Robustness and Sensitivity Tests
Because both the test variable for IS firms and one of the three discretionary expenses
from equation 4 are composed of R&D expenses, we replicate the test regarding abnormal
activity for discretionary expenses without including R&D expenses (see Cohen, Dey, &
Lys, 2008). In untabulated results we find that upon elimination of R&D expenses from the
calculation of DiscExp, our conclusions regarding the extent to which IS firms manipulate
earnings using discretionary expenses remain unchanged.
To ensure that the results regarding earnings management are not sensitive to particular
industries, we replicate the tests for real activities and discretionary accruals without
limiting the sample to industries that are R&D intensive. In untabulated results we find no
change in the direction or significance level of the test variables in the real activities tests
for earnings management. In the tests of accrual based earnings management, we find
that the level of significance increases to 1% for the Bench variable for all three measures
of discretionary accruals and that the level of significance for the interaction variable
increases to 5% in the Positive DA test and to 1% in the interaction variable in the Negative
DA test with no change in direction in either case.
We also replicate our results for the earnings management sample for tests regarding
real activities management and discretionary accruals including several control variables
for executive compensation as in Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008). The additional variables
included are defined as follows:
Bonus is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received
by the CEO and the CFO of a firm;
Ex_Option is exercisable options and is the number of unexercised options that the
executives held at year-end that were vested scaled by total outstanding shares of the
firm;
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Un_Option is unexercisable options defined as the number of unexercised options
(excluding option grants in the current period) that the executives held at year-end that
have not vested scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm;
Gt_Option is new option grants made during the current period scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm;
Owner is the sum of restricted stock grants in the current period and the aggregate
number of shares held by the executives at year-end (excluding stock options) scaled by
total outstanding shares of the firm;
Inclusion of these additional controls for executive compensation dramatically reduces
the sample size for these tests to 3,199 observations. However, in untabulated results we
find that our results and conclusions remain unchanged with the exception of the tests
regarding abnormal cash flow from operations which become insignificant.
4 CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
Prior research describes and clearly demonstrates the existence of earnings management
(e.g. Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Das, Shroff & Zhang, 2009; Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser,
1999; Hayn, 1995). The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree to which firms
that have a strategy focused on innovation participate in earnings management relative
to firms that are not focused on innovation. The association between innovation strategy
and earnings management is measured using proxies described in the literature for
income smoothing, strategic use of real activities, and the manipulation of discretionary
accruals. Consistent with the hypotheses that IS firms smooth earnings, use real activities,
and record discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, the results show that firms with
an innovative firm strategy manage earnings to a greater extent than do non-innovation
firms. Specifically, the results indicate that innovative firms engage in income smoothing,
real activities earnings manipulation and discretionary accruals to meet earnings
benchmarks to a greater degree than do non-IS firms.
The results of this paper contribute to the literature by providing additional insight to the
understanding of earnings management activity, and will be useful to market participants
by specifically documenting the relationship between a firm with an overall strategy
focused on innovation and the extent of earnings management. These results also inform
managers, regulators, and other stakeholders to be aware that, although the intended
outcome of an innovation strategy is normally to increase firm value by marketing new
and innovative products or services, an innovation strategy could also affect the way in
which income is measured for those firms.
We recognize three limitations to the analysis we perform in this study. First, a large
number of observations were eliminated from the sample used in this study due to missing
data in the commercial databases employed. This reduction in the sample size could have
an impact on the generalizability of the results. Second, although the control variables
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that were used in all equations for this study were drawn from prior accounting literature,
it is possible that relevant controls were omitted from the models. Third, in accordance
with U.S. GAAP, the firms included in our sample generally expense R&D costs as they
are incurred. Limited exceptions to this rule include the capitalization of software and
website development costs. However, capitalization of R&D expenses permitted under
other methods of accounting such as IFRS could have an effect on our results, especially
as it relates to income smoothing and other earnings manipulation through the alteration
of real activities. The potential to capitalize R&D expenses could alter the decisions of
management regarding these real activities and could affect the extent to which firms
manipulate earnings.
This study concentrates exclusively on innovation strategy. There are a wide range of
other firm strategies that have not been examined in this study. Ittner and Larcker
(2001) clarify that firm strategies need not be located only on a continuum between
firms following a “cost leadership” and firms following an “innovation strategy”. Firm
strategies can also include higher quality, differentiation through image, superior
customer service, a focus on a particular market niche, being flexible in responding
to customer demands or mimicking innovations of competitors. Future research
could examine the effect of any of these other firm strategies on the extent of earnings
management.
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